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at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2004 
This thesis examines the relationship between trade policy and the environment in 
developing countries. Using a framework of a small open economy with a separate 
abatement sector, we study the impacts of import tariffs and emissions taxes. This setup 
allows producers either to pollute or to abate, depending on the market price of the 
abatement service. In order to make the models close to the real world settings, we 
incorporate the unemployment problems caused by the minimum wage and labor unions 
into our analyses. 
According to our findings, trade liberalization may not necessarily be beneficial to 
developing countries. In the benchmark case where there is no distortion in the labor 
market, trade liberalization is welfare improving because it eliminates tariff-induced 
emissions. Similarly in the case of minimum wage, free trade policy could help correct 
the wage distortion in the labor market. At the same time, it enhances environmental 
quality and social welfare. Nonetheless, when labor unions exist, trade liberalization 
imposes a dilemma between jobs and the environment. When trade is liberalized, the 
manufacturing industry contracts due to international competition. The tariff-induced 
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Chapter 1 Overview 
Environmentalists believe less developed countries (LDCs) will become the victim of 
environmental degradation as a consequence of globalization. One of the prevalent 
arguments is the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, which claims, under trade liberalization, 
LDCs would end up producing pollution-intensive goods because the environmental 
standards in LDCs are usually less stringent and thus the compliance cost to 
environmental regulations is lower. This claim seems to be sustained by the early 
theoretic works on trade and environment. Treating environmental policy as exogenous, 
the difference in environmental policy plays an important role in determining countries' 
comparative advantage and trade pattern (Pethig 1976，Siebert et al. 1980，McGuire 1982, 
Copeland and Taylor 1994, Chichilnisky 1994). However, empirical findings are in 
general ambiguous. Some researchers find that the production of pollution-intensive 
goods in LDCs rise when developed countries tighten their environmental policies 
(Robinson 1988，Low and Yeast 1992，Luca et. al. 1992’ Birdsall and Wheeler 1992). 
While others suggest the link is insignificant (Kalt 1988，Tobey 1990，Grossman and 
Krueger 1993，Levinson 1996，Van Beers and van den Bergh 1997). Recently, Chua 
(2003) suggests the weak empirical support on Pollution Haven Hypothesis may due to 
the treatment of pollution as a production factor in the model. In his model, he no longer 
treats pollution as a production factor. Instead, he adds a separate abatement sector to 
capture the effect of pollution. Following this framework, the model predicts that higher 
pollution tax may not necessarily increase the price of dirty goods. That is to say, 
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developed countries may not loose comparative advantage as it has been previously 
predicted. 
Besides, these models are limited by not incorporating the characteristics of LDCs. In 
developing countries, government often adopts trade policy, e.g. import substitution 
policy, to protect their manufacturing industries. As a result, the urban region is 
commonly found with high unemployment rate. Further, the role of labor unions in 
developing countries should not be neglected. Labor union leaders are usually embedded 
with influential political power that they often lobby for protection policy. Trade 
protection is obviously not a good policy to LDCs. Indeed, it encourages labor migration 
to the urban region that exacerbates urban unemployment. As a result, government faces 
to a even larger political pressure to adopt protection policy. If the protection sector is 
pollution-intensive, trade restrictions may create environmental damage in addition to the 
problem of urban unemployment. In other words, we need a model that includes trade 
barriers in the presence of market imperfections, such as unemployment and labor unions, 
to properly address the environmental impact in LDCs. 
Theoretically, the environmental impact of trade liberalization in developing countries 
is not clear. Previous works show that trade liberalization may not necessarily be 
beneficial to developing countries. In fact, it depends on the comparative advantage of 
the protected sector (Lopez 1994’ Copeland and Taylor 1994, Chichilnisky 1994, Brander 
and Taylor 1998, Dean 2002). Yet, the results from these models are hardly applicable to 
LDCs as it does not take the unemployment issue and the impact of labor unions into 
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account. There are two models that come close to our research interests.' First, Chao 
and Yu (2003a) find there is a trade-off relationship between jobs and environmental 
quality. Thus, government will adopt lax environmental policy to solve the 
unemployment problem. The second is Dean and Gangopadhyay (1997)，who find export 
restrictions may be optimal to correct environmental and unemployment problems in the 
long run. But, the former analysis is solely based on the use of pollution taxes while the 
latter focuses on the trade policies used in the export sector only. 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide possible explanations on the 
environmental impact of trade liberalization to LDCs，which is characterized by trade 
barriers in the import sector with market distortions, i.e. urban unemployment and labor 
unions. These improvements allow us to infer analyses on the Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis in a closer real world setting. Further, we use import tariff as a trade policy 
to study how trade liberalization affects environment and social welfare. Since the 
treatment of pollution production factors do not sustain at the empirical level, we are 
going to employ Chua's (2003) model, to investigate the environmental impact and the 
welfare implications in response to trade liberalization. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
development regarding international trade and environment. Chapter 3 sketches the 
benchmark model of a small open economy where import tariff is adopted. The effects of 
import tariff on environment and social welfare in a small open economy will be studied. 
In Chapter 4，the problem of sectoral unemployment will be introduced to the model. In 
1 Yabuuchi and Beladi (2001) find that wage subsidies lower urban unemployment and thus it is welfare 
enhancing. Their analysis however does not discuss the potential environmental impact in LDCs. 
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particular, we are interested to study whether import tariff will affect environmental 
quality and social welfare in the presence of minimum wage. Chapter 5 will mainly 
focus on the interaction between labor unions and environment under the import tariff 
regime. The link between labor unions and environment has rarely been discussed in the 
literature. We therefore employ a perfectly competitive market to complement the 
literature in this area. Lastly, some concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In early 70s, researchers start to examine whether environmental regulations will lead 
to the loss of competitiveness when countries open up its markets. It is because countries 
with stringent regulations will face to higher level of production cost due to the additional 
environmental control costs (ECC.) Thus, unilateral regulation will lead to the loss of 
competitiveness when facing to international competition. In the following sections, we 
will first explore the studies regarding the relationship between income growth and 
environmental quality. Then, a brief review on the theoretical development and empirical 
studies on trade and environment will be provided. Next are the discussions on welfare 
analysis and trade restrictions. The last two sections will investigate the environmental 
impact of developing countries when the problems of urban unemployment and labor 
unions exist. 
2.1 Incom e growth and pollution 
In Grossman's and Krueger's study (1993)，they find that per capita income and 
emissions of SO2 exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship - the environmental Kuznets 
curve (EKC.) That is, pollution rises as income rises at the early stage and declines later. 
Their study is important as it demonstrates trade liberalization may improve environment 
through income growth. Copeland and Taylor (1994) later find that income difference is 
important to determine trade pattern. Under free trade, the South (with lower income) 
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tends to produce pollution-intensive goods. Thus, trade liberalization leads to a higher 
pollution level in the South. 
2,2 Environmental regulations and comparative advantage 
Researchers often study the effect of trade liberalization on environment by 
treating pollution as a production factor. Under this two-sector theoretical framework, 
developing countries tend to gain a comparative advantage in producing pollution-
intensive goods. That is, pollution will rise in developing countries and decrease in 
developed countries. Hence, the stringency of environmental regulations has an impact 
on the pattern of trade. Pethig (1976) uses a two-good Ricardian model to show how 
environmental policy affects the pattern of trade. In his model, pollution is modeled as a 
by-product of production; two countries are identical except that they differ in exogenous 
emission level. He shows that country with lower emission levels will export the 
pollution-intensive good. McGuire (1982) extends Pethig's study by using Heckscher-
Ohlin model. If factors are mobile across countries, total pollution will be solely 
produced in the non-regulating country. Thus, the differences in environmental policy 
could determine the pattern of trade. Likewise, Chichilnisky (1994) investigates the same 
issue in the context of property rights policy. She finds that countries with ill-defined 
property rights gain a comparative advantage in exporting environmentally intensive 
goods. These theoretical results are consistent with the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. 
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In contrast, Chua (2003) employs a different analytical framework to explore what 
determines the pattern of trade. In his model, there exists a seperate abatement sector 
which provides abatement technology to final-goods producers in the economy. Final-
goods producers can either purchase abatement services to lower emissions or pay 
pollution taxes. He finds that higher pollution taxes do not always increase the relative 
price of pollution-intensive goods as predicted by previous models. This is because the 
effect of pollution tax depends on the relative tax burden of final goods and the factor 
returns. Essentially, the result does not show that difference in environmental policy will 
have an impact on countries' pattern of trade. 
2.2,1 The impact of environmental Regulation on trade pattern 
As shown previously, countries with relatively lax environmental policy tend to have a 
comparative advantage in producing pollution-intensive goods. In empirical literature, 
the evidences are ambiguous. Some are consistent with Pollution Haven Hypothesis 
(Low and Yeast 1992, Luca et. al 1992, Birdsall and Wheeler 1992); some are not (Kalt 
1988，Tobey 1990，Grossman and Krueger 1993，Van Beers and van den Bergh 1997). 
Using the data set from 1965-1988, Low and Yeast (1992) find that the share of "dirty 
goods" from North America fell from 18.5 to 14.2 percent whereas the share increased by 
6 percent in Eastern Europe, 2 percent in Latin America. The results suggest that "dirty" 
industries relocate in developing countries. Similar results have been obtained by Lucas 
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et al. (1992) who examine the toxic intensity change of manufacturing output over 80 
countries from 1960 to 1988. Once OECD imposes stricter regulations, the toxic intensity 
falls in developed countries but increases in developing countries. Furthermore, Birdsall 
and Wheeler (1992) carry the Pollution Haven Hypothesis study using data from Latin 
American countries. Their results show that Latin American experiences a higher growth 
rate of toxic intensity after the imposition of the stricter environmental policy in OECD 
countries. 
Yet, Kalt's (1988)，Tobey (1990), and van Beers amd Van den Bergh (1997) do not 
find the stringency of environmental policy is statistically significant on U.S. and OECD 
net exports. Similarly, Grossman and Krueger (1993) study the environmental impacts of 
a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The result shows that human capital 
and labor are very significant in determining the pattern of trade Mexico; however, the 
cross country differences in abatement costs are not. 
2.2.2 Plant location and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Empirical studies also examine the Pollution Haven Hypothesis by studying the 
relocation of plants and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI.) Based on the 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis, "dirty" industries will migrate to developing countries once 
the environmental policy is tightened in developed countries. However, Bartik (1988)， 
McConnell and Schwab (1990) do not find environmental policy statistically significant 
to business relocations for Fortune 500 companies and vehicle plants in U.S. Although 
Levinson's (1996) finds that large companies are more sensitive to the stringency of state 
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environmental regulations, the environmental regulations are not statistically significant 
at industry level. Yet, once the endogeneity of environmental regulations is controlled, 
List et al. (2001), Keller and Levinson (2002) and Fredreksoon et al. (2003) show that 
environmental regulations have significant relationship with business locations. 
2,3 Welfare implications : Optimal policy in a second-best world 
Whether free trade is good to environment or not, the problem of environmental 
damage calls for an immediate and efficient policy to eliminate production externalities. 
Despite trade liberalization raises social welfare, the first best policy is hard to achieve 
given the presence of environmental distortions and political constraints. Hence, 
researchers often employ the second-best analysis to explore optimal policy instruments 
(Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). 
2,3.1 Trade restriction as second-best policy 
As shown, pollution occurs when economy fails to internalize environmental damage 
costs. The first-best policy instruments often discussed in the literature are optimal 
emission taxes or tradeable permits. However, there are growing research interests on the 
use of trade restrictions to achieve environmental objectives. Baumol and Oates (1988) 
and Krutilla (1991) show that import tariff could be the optimal second-best choice for a 
large country. By investigating the optimal environmental policy with one pollution 
distortion and one trade distortion, Krutilla finds that the optimal environmental tax is 
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larger than the standard Pigouvian tax for net exporter if externalities are from production. 
He also shows that the combination of a standard optimal tariff and a standard Pigouvian 
tax is the joint optimal policy for an open economy. Copeland (1994) further finds that 
uniform reductions in import tariff will improve welfare when quota is binding; whereas 
the welfare effect of trade liberalization is ambiguous when pollution taxes are used. It 
depends upon the pollution intensity of the protected industry. He also suggests that 
policy coordination on environmental policy and trade policy should be reformed 
gradually to ensure welfare improvement. 
In addition to tariff, Chao and Yu (2000) extend the second-best analysis of jointly 
optimal environmental policy with trade related investment measures (TRIMs) in the 
presence of quantitative restrictions. When tariff is imposed on the import sectors, 
welfare is improved if pollution tax is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate and if full export 
requirements are in place. However under the import quota regime, the joint policy mix is 
to set pollution tax at the Pigouvian tax rate and to set export requirement at zero level. 
As with voluntary export restraints (VERs，) the joint optimal requires pollution tax to be 
lower than the Pigouvian tax rate and an appropriate level of (e.g. less than 100 percent) 
export requirement. 
2.5.2 Double Dividend Hypothesis 
The prominent advocates of double dividend are Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), who 
argue that government can use the revenue generated from environmental taxes to 
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decrease other distortionary taxes, for example, the taxes on labor supply. As a result, the 
environmental tax not only decreases environmental damage (the first dividend) but also 
alleviates the preexisting tax distortion (the second dividend). Their discussion on the 
interaction of the environmental distortion and the labor tax distortion is essentially a 
second-best case. In their study, they demonstrate the optimal level of pollution tax is 
lower than the Pigovian tax rate. In other words, pollution tax fully internalizes the 
marginal damage. They also show that if pollution tax revenue is used in lump-sum 
transfer, the preexisting tax distortion will be further aggravated due to the high level of 
unemployment. 
Z4 Unemployment and the Environment 
The link between unemployment and environment has rarely been discussed in the 
literature. Dean and Gangopadhyay (1997) employ the theoretical framework developed 
by Harris and Todaro (1970) to study how export taxes imposed on the logging industry 
affect environment in developing countries. Their results show that export taxes help 
solve the unemployment problem and alleviate the environmental damage in the long run. 
In contrast, Chao and Yu (2003a) find that there exists a trade-off between employment 
and environment in a vertically linked model. If pollution taxes are imposed on 
upstream firm, severe unemployment will be resulted. They argue governments will 
adopt less stringent environmental policy in order to secure employment in labor market. 
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2.5 Labor Union and International Trade 
Grossman (1984) examines how international competition affects labor union, whose 
objective is to maximize the welfare of the median voter. He concludes the response of 
the elasticity of the union wage to international price change depends on the production 
technology. Furthermore, the seniority rule seems to have ambiguous effects in 
explaining why union wage fails to adjust with respect to international price change. 
Some researchers employ Nash-Coumot game to study the impact of trade policies to 
union power in an imperfect competitive international market (Brander and Spencer 
1988). They find that the imposition of tariff raises domestic labor demand as well as the 
union wage but reduces domestic output. They conclude, in the unionized economy, the 
price responses to import tariff tend to be stronger. Also, the domestic union has greatly 
reduced the impact on imports and domestic production to import tariff. However, it is 
difficult to determine the optimal tariff rate corresponding to the impact of domestic 
union. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) extend Brander and Spencer's study but change 
the game framework slightly. Instead of deciding the union wage in the first stage, their 
framework allows union wage be endogenously determined by the model following on 
the firms' decision in the second stage. The results are similar to Brander and Spencer's 
except the impact of import tariff. In their model, the impact of protection depends on 
the shape of the demand curve and the union's utility curve. For employment-oriented 
unions, protection raises output and welfare regardless the shape of the demand curve. 
As for the wage-oriented unions, protection may decrease domestic output if the demand 
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is convex. They also analyze the credible threat by shifting production abroad so that the 
firms can improve its bargaining position with unions. In this case, tariff benefits labor 
unions by increasing the production cost for domestic firms. 
Naylor (1998) examines the impact of unions to economic integration. He finds that 
integrations increase unions' wage demands, which in turn raise unions' utilities. Since 
economic integration increases consumer surplus, he concludes the overall impact of 
integration is welfare-enhancing. While many theoretical discussions have centered 
around the import tariff, Zhao (2001) examines the impact of an import quota to labor 
unions. He finds the imposition of import quota in the unionized sector not only lowers 
the union employment and union wage, but also the competitive wage and the monopoly 
rents. 
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Chapter 3 Tariffs and the Environment 
3.1 The model 
In this chapter, we use a general equilibrium model to study the interaction of trade 
policy and the environmental policy. First, consider a small open economy where it is 
endowed with fixed supplies of factors, capital K and labor L. The economy consists of 
manufacturing sector X, agricultural sector 7 and abatement sector i 
In the factor markets, the full employment conditions require that: 
K = K^ +Ky (1) 
L = L^ + Ly (2) 
where K. and!,, denote the labor and capital employed in the /th sector {i = X,Y and A) 
respectively. Factors are perfectly mobile across sectors with the return rate of r for 
capital and w for labor. 
The final goods market is perfectly competitive. All firms adopt constant returns to 
scale technologies in production. The production functions of X and Y are concave and 
linearly homogeneous : 
X = X{L,,K^) (3) 
Y = Y(Ly,Ky) (4) 
Choosing Y as the numeraire, the price of l i s denoted hyp. 
During the processes of production, pollution is generated as a by-product of goods X 
and Y (Copeland 1994). In contrast to traditional framework where pollution is treated 
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as a production factor, we follow Chua's (2003) model in which producers can either 
purchase abatement services from the abatement sector at the price of p^ or pay an 
emissions tax r to government. To simplify the model, it is convenient to assume that 
A^ (AjO units of pollution are generated for each unit of output of goodX(Y) if firms do 
not undertake abatement activity. Hence, the net emissions should equal to the total 
emissions minus the pollution cleaned up by the abatement sector. It is defined as 
follows : 
Z = A^X + AyY-A (5) 
where A. is the unit of gross emissions per each unit of final good i produced, and A is 
the abatement services demanded by producers from sectors l a n d Y. Given that pollution 
is public bad, it is harmful to consumer but it does not generate external effects on 
production functions. That is, it does not affect the productivity of other producers. 
By Chua (2003)，the abatement service is undertaken by an external sector to clean up 
pollution. Assume that sectors X and Y apply an identical abatement technology, the 
production function of abatement service is = which is constant, concave 
and linearly homogeneous. For simplicity, the abatement sector itself does not create 
pollution. 
In equilibrium, producers are indifferent to abate or to pollute because p^ equals r . 
After taking the emission tax burden and abatement cost into account, the effective prices 
of goods X and 7 are : p-t�and l-rXy . 
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Suppose that it is a labor-abundant country. By Hescckscher-Ohlin theorem, it 
exports labor-intensive good Y and imports capital-intensive good X. Due to the small 
country assumption, country takes world price p* as given. In order to protect the 
manufacturing sector, government restricts imports by imposing specific tariff t. The 
domestic price o f X i s thus increased by t per unit of output i.e. p =/?* + / . 
The supply side of the model can be summarized with a revenue function. In the 
private sector, firms choose the level of inputs to maximize their profits for a given price 
level of p - tX^，1 - tX^ and p^ . Denoting the revenue function by R, the solution to an 
optimization problem can be posed as : 
- T^^x，1 - , P a , L , K ) 
ip - rXx WLx，尺 J + (1 — ^^y ，火y) 1 (6) 
=max< ^ 
The revenue function is concave in L, K and convex in prices. By the envelope 
theorem, R , = — = X, R. = — = r, R, = — = w. Due to Heckscher-
P d(p-TX^) K QK dL 
己2 R 
Ohlin structure, R^^ 二 ~ — = 0 {i = K, L). Also, the convexity of the revenue function in 
di 
prices implies that the supply of good is a positive function of its own price, 
16 
Alternatively, the above production technologies can be represented by their costs. 
The unit cost functions for X, Y and A are : c^ (w,r)，c^ (w,r) and c义(w,r) . They are 
concave and with homogeneous of degree one in w and r. Under perfect competition, 
unit cost must equal unit price in equilibrium because firms earn zero profit. 
P-TJIj^ = c ^ ( w , r ) (7) 
l-rAy =c'(w,r) (8) 
P,=c\w,r) (9) 
From equation (9)，we know that the supply of abatement services depends on p^ . 
The higher the p^ , the more the supply of abatement services. That is, the supply of 
abatement services is a function of p^ (See Appendix I ) : 
A = A{p,) (10) 
In addition, by Shephard's lemma, and c(0，r) yield optimal values of unit 
factor demand a" and a沿 respectively (i = X, Y and A.) In equilibrium, total demand 
for factors equal its total supply. 
c,^ (w，r)X + c： (w, r ) 7 + c： (w, r�A 二 L (11) 
cf {w, r)X + cl (w, r)Y + c^ {w, r)A = K (12) 
On the demand side, a representative consumer chooses consumption goods C^，Cy 
to minimize their expenditure. For simplicity, we assume preferences over consumption 
is quasi-linear : m =v(C^) + Q - g ( Z ) , where v'> 0 and g’> 0 . To summarize, the 
expenditure function can be written as : 
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E{p,Z,u) = mm{pC^+Cy \u=v{C^) + Cy - g ( Z ) } (13) 
which gives the minimum cost of attaining utility level m at a given p and current level of 
environmental quality Z. By the envelop property, we obtain = 1 and E^ = g\Z) > 0 
(Appendix I). E^ measures the social marginal damage caused by pollution. When the 
pollution level increases in the economy, utility level declines by g\Z) . Using 
Shephard's lemma, the derivative of the expenditure function with respect to p yields the 
demand for good X，i.e. E = C^ . Due to quasi-linear preference, price effect 
only changes the demand for good X while the income effect goes entirely to the demand 
for good Y. In addition, the environmental quality Z does not affect the demand for good 
Xas C^ and Z are separable in the utility function. 
To close out the model, we consider economy's budget constraint. Assuming that tax 
and tariff revenues are rebated to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, the equilibrium 
condition of the economy is given by: 
E{p,Z,u) = {p-TX^)X + (\-TXy)Y + P,A + TZ + tM (14) 
M 二 Ep(p,Z，u) -Rp. (p -rA^,1 — r A , ( 1 5 ) 
where M denotes the imports of good X. Equation (14) states that the total expenditure 
equals the total revenue from the production of goods X’ Y and the abatement activity, A 
plus the pollution tax and import tariff. As stated in equation (15)，the net import demand 
of good A'is the difference between its domestic consumption E^ and its local supply . 
Equations (7) - (12), (14) - (15) describe a small open economy, which consists of 
eight unknowns \ t , w, r, X, Y, A, M and u plus one policy instrument t. The system is 
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block recursive: equations (7) - (9) determine the price variables t，w and r while 
equations (10) - (12) solve the optimal value for output variables X’ Y and A. The 
information on prices and outputs are then used to analyze the impact on the welfare u 
from equations (14) and (15). 
3,2 Resource Allocation - The effects of import tariffs 
In order to examine the effect of import tariff on environment and welfare, the 
changes on prices and outputs will be studied. Total differentiate equations (7) — (9)，we 
find that the impact on factor prices in response to import tariff is determined by the 
relative factor intensity of abatement sector and manufacturing sector. An initial increase 
in tariff t will give a rise to p. Due to perfect competition, the unit cost of producing 
good ；^ will increase according to equation (7). Since good l i s a capital-intensive good, 
the demand for capital K^ must be higher than that for labor L；^ . The return to capital 
will increase : 
今 = (16) 
at A, 
f x Y\ f.x A\ ( A 
where A. ^ c ^ c , ： � ^ X . c t c t ^ ^ ^ c t > 0 
C�v J ^w J \ V  W J 
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By stability conditions shown in Appendix I, it requires the manufacturing sector to be 
the most capital-intensive. The abatement sector comes in the second, and the agricultural 
cX c^ cf cf c^ cl 
sector is the least capital-intensive, i.e. > > - y and - j > . 
^w ^w ^w ^w ^w ^w 
Since the price of good Y remains unchanged, the increased cost on capital and the 
pollution tax burden have altogether brought up the production cost in the agricultural 
sector. According to equation (8), higher production cost leads to a reduction in the wage 
rate : 
^ = (17) 
at A, 
Under perfect competition, the emissions tax must increase. As shown above, import 
tariff has inevitably raised the cost on capital. According to equation (9)，this result leads 
to an increase in the effective price of abatement good A, p^ because it is relatively 
capital-intensive. Thus, the emissions tax r must rise as p^ and r are equal in 
equilibrium. 
2 = 丄 ( / c ^ £L_ — > 0 (18) 
A w^w A Y \ 乂 
dt A 丨 {c^^ c ^ J 
Next is to study the impact of environmental quality Z in the presence of import tariff. 
Recap the definition of Z by equation (5), which is the gross emissions from producing X 
and r m i n u s the pollution cleaned up by abatement activity, A. That is, the impact on Z is 
determined by the changes of output composition in sectors X�Y and A in response to an 
increase of import tariff: 
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严 + 义 广 0 (19) 
dt dt dt dt 
By equation (18)，we have shown that import tariff raises p^ . This results in an 
expansion of abatement sector : 
^ = (20) 
dt dP八 dt 
where > 0 , as shown in Appendix I. From equations (11)-(12)，we can solve the 
dPA 
output effects in response to import tariff: 
！ 召 宇 1 •。 (21) 
dt A, [cf, c l ) dt\ 
+ 宇 (22) 
dt c^A, t^w c t j d t ] 
cX c^ 
where A, =— i - > 0 , B > 0 and D > 0 (Appendix I). As explained previously, 
import tariff raises the effective price of good X initially. This encourages an expansion 
in the manufacturing sector. As emissions increase, it pushes up r which in turn 
encourages abatement activity. Since the abatement production requires more capital 
than labor, it actually cuts back the manufacturing production. These two contradictory 
effects contribute to the ambiguity in the manufacturing production, see equation (21). 
Chua's (2003) explains this production ambiguity depends on the relative tax burden 
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between good X and good Y. He shows only if good Z is capital-intensive and pollution-
intensive, i.e. > Ay, p will rise and thus the manufacturing production. Similarly, 
according to Antweiler et al. (2001)，the strength of this output effect depends on the 
t (It 
elasticity of emissions tax to import t a r i f f , � ’ , = - - — . I f < 1，that means one 
"Z" ctt 
percentage of change in import tariff will follow by less than one percentage of change in 
the emissions tax. In this case, the output of manufacturing goods should proportionally 
rise more than that of abatement goods, — > 0 by equation (21). ^ What follows is the 
at 
decline in the agricultural sector, — < 0 , as shown in equation (22). To explain, an 
dt 
increase in the emissions tax will stimulate the abatement production resulting in higher 
demand for capital. This will pull out resources from producing final goods. Given that 
less capital is available, the price of capital-intensive goods increases causing the supply 
of manufacturing good to increase. At the same time, due to fewer factors of inputs 
available in the agricultural sector, the agricultural production contracts by Rybczynski 
theorem. The environmental quality worsens, — > 0 if the output effect in the 
dt 
manufacturing sector outweighs that in both the abatement sector and the agricultural 
sector. 
2 Note that pollution tax t represents the unit cost of marginal damage. Antweiler et al. (2001) show that 
if the elasticity of marginal damage to price is less than 1，then the manufacturing production will expand 
proportionally more than the abatement sector due to pure substitution effect. 
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3,3 National welfare 
We can obtain the impact of import tariff on welfare by totally differentiating 
equation (14). Note that dp = dt for world price is fixed. In general, the change in 
welfare can be expressed as follows : 
EJu = {j-Ez�dZ + tdM (25) 
E^du measures the change in welfare, where = 1 is the inverse of the marginal utility 
of income. Equation (25) shows that the welfare level is dependent on two distortions. 
The first term on the right-hand side is the pollution distortion. If emission tax r is lower 
than the marginal damage caused by pollution E^, reduction in emissions will be welfare 
improving. The second term represents the trade distortions created by import tariff. As 
seen, an increase in imports i.e. dM >0 improves welfare (Copeland 1994). From 
equation (25), we obtain the first-best optimum. Free trade { t = 0 ) and Pigouvian tax 
(r =五z), which fully internalizes the marginal damage by pollution, altogether is the 
first-best policy to a small open economy with the environmental externality. 
We further expand equation (25) to obtain the results in terms of import tariff. 
Totally differentiating equation (15)，we have 
dM = (£•评-Rp’p)dt + E,du + R^^{X^ ^Xy-\)dr (26) 
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Substituting equation (26) into equation (25) yields the following : 
(Eu-tEpu�l = t[Epp-Rpp�HT-Ez�i + tRpMx + 义r - l ) f (27) 
The welfare is determined by three distortions, namely, trade distortion, pollution 
distortion as well as the spillover effect on trade distortion respectively. Rewrite 
E 
(E^ -tE^J as E^du(\-tm)，where m = — ^ is the marginal propensities to consume, 
Eu 
and hence the tariff multiplier, (7 - tm) > 0. 
Now, we consider the changes on social welfare in response to import tariff. 
According to equation (27)，the first term on the right-hand side is trade distortion, 
t (E -R . ) . E -R . measures the substitution effect from imports to domestic 
\ pp pp^ pp pp 
goods. By envelop property, E ^ 二 < 0 and 灼 = — > 0 . Hence, the trade 
distortion is welfare reducing as consumers switch to the expensive domestic goods due 
to import tariff, t (五 " " -扑）< 0 . As shown, an increase in import tariff, t, magnifies 
the distortion. 
The following term is the pollution distortion, in which E^ measures the marginal 
damage caused by pollution. Per earlier discussion, the pollution distortion deteriorates, 
——> 0 if the output effect of manufacturing production dominates. As t increases, it 
dt 
stimulates the domestic production of good X bringing up the emissions taxes. For an 
initial low level of the emissions taxes, TKE^/IX fails to fully internalize the marginal 
damage caused by pollution and thus creates negative impact to the economy. 
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dr 
The last term is the spillover effect on trade distortion. By equation (18), — - > 0 . 
at 
Also, equation (8) shows that p and r are inversely related, holding import tariff t 
constant. That is, an increase in the emission taxes discourages the production of good X 
and thus reduces emissions i.e. R.,, = — < 0 . The term tR (又;^ +Zy-\), measures 
‘ dr 
the tariff distortion via output effect, is indeterminate. Note that this result is different to 
that in the previous literature. In early models, an increase in the emissions taxes causes 
the pollution-intensive industries to contract due to higher production cost. Provided the 
pollution-intensive industry is subject to trade protection, pollution policy creates a 
positive spillover effect, which helps reduce the tariff-induced output in the protected 
sector. That is, the trade distortion is partially corrected by the environmental policy 
reform, - t R � � > 0 (Copeland 1994). Nonetheless, in our case, the result depends on the 
marginal net emissions X j ^ + ^ y - l in the economy. To look closely, the marginal net 
emissions is determined by the net emissions from producing one unit of Z a n d one unit 
of Y and the pollution cleaned up by one unit of abatement service. Since good X is 
capital-intensive and pollution-intensive, it is reasonable to assume that the marginal 
pollution supply is more than the marginal abatement demand, i.e. A；^  + Aj, - 1 > 0, then 
dz 
the spillover effect on the tariff distortion will be negative, i.e. tRp�(A^ +Ay - 1 ) — < 0 . 
In this case, the environmental reform is not helpful in correcting trade distortion and 
thus import tariff hurts welfare. 
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In conclusion, for a small open economy, trade protection is a bad policy because it 
could possibly damage environment and hurt social welfare. The sufficient conditions to 
satisfy this result are when a country imposes low emissions taxes and its manufacturing 
production dominates. In other words, a combination of lax environmental policy and 
protection policy will generate excessive emissions causing social welfare to decline. 
3,4 Trade Liberalization 
Now, we consider the impact on environment and social welfare when trade is 
liberalized in LDCs. From equations (18)，(19) and (27), we have : 
山 A A Y 
dt A, c j 
dZ , dX , dY ciA „ 
———+ Jiy > 0 
dt dt dt dt 
(E “-tEpu�l = t (Epp - Rpp) + (r —五z) J + tR-,(义,+ 义广 1)苦 < 0 
When LDCs liberalize its markets by lowering tariff, we immediately see that the 
emissions tax rate and the net emissions level will decrease, whereas the social welfare 
will increase. 
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Proposition 1 ： Assuming z < E^, a reduction in tariff will increase welfare but reduce 
environmental damage when the manufacturing production dominates. 
To see this result, we know that the reduction of import tariff will cause the protected 
sector, i.e. manufacturing sector, to contract. Hence, the impact of trade distortion is 
alleviated. Since the manufacturing sector is pollution-intensive, a decrease in its 
production will reduce emissions. That is, trade liberalization will have a positive 
spillover effect on pollution. As a result, the emissions taxes decline in response to a 
lower abatement demand. Trade liberalization leads to an enhancement on social welfare 
in LDCs. 
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Chapter 4 Tariffs，Unemployment and the Environment 
In the post World War II period, many less-developed countries (LDCs) attempt to 
accelerate their economic growth by protecting domestic manufacturing industries. This 
strategy is commonly referred as import substitution industrialization. Among all import 
substitution arguments, the infant industry argument is the most powerful argument that 
has been favored by LDCs governments. The basic idea is that the start-up cost in the 
manufacturing industries is usually expensive for LDCs , and thus it makes them difficult 
to meet international competition. As a result, government should give temporarily 
support to new manufacturing industries until they have become competitive enough. 
Based on the infant industry argument, LDCs governments could use trade policies such 
as import tariffs or quotas as temporary measures to help out manufacturing sector. 
Yet, the infant industry argument is not as compelling as it sounds. In recent decades, 
the import substitution industrialization has been criticized for the cause of creating the 
dual economy. Many economists believe trade policies inadvertently aggravate the urban 
unemployment problem in LDCs. It is because the wage offered in the manufacturing 
sector is several times higher than that in the agricultural sector. The wage differential 
encourages labor to migrate from the rural to the urban region which, in turn, results in 
higher urban unemployment rate. This phenomenon has been studied by Harris and 
Todaro (1970)，who find that rural workers are willing to take the risk of being 
unemployed in the cities in return for the chance of getting high-paying industrial jobs. 
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In spite of increased manufacturing jobs, the wage gain is largely offset by the wage loss 
of the unemployed. Hence, the social benefit of additional manufacturing employment is 
lost. 
In 1996，Bovenberg and van der Ploeg examine the relationship of urban 
unemployment and environmental externalities. Their results reveal that if the initial 
environmental concern is small, greener preferences might boost employment and public 
consumption. Further, pollution is reduced through the expansion of labor-intensive (i.e. 
less pollution-intensive) production. Schneider (1997) also obtains similar "double 
dividend" result. As for Dean and Gangopadhyay (1997), they study the resource 
management strategy for the logging industry in Indonesia. They find that export tax is 
an effective tool to solve the problems of unemployment and environmental damage. 
Recently, Chao and Yu (2003a) reexamine the linkage between unemployment and 
environment in a vertical production framework. In their paper, the chain effect of high 
pollution taxes leads to a contraction of upstream firms which, in turn, worsens urban 
unemployment. The result shows that policy makers might adopt less stringent 
environmental policy to solve the unemployment problem. If so, the pollution taxes do 
not necessarily improve environmental quality and lower unemployment rate as in 
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996) and Schneider (1997). 
Is it optimal for LDCs to use trade policy to solve the unemployment problem while 
keeping the environment clean at the same time ？ 
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4.1 The model 
In order to investigate the environmental impact in LDCs where urban unemployment 
exists, we need to reconstruct Chua's analytical framework (2003) to describe a dual 
economy. As mentioned above, Harris-Todaro (1970) model is an appropriate 
framework to capture the dual feature. 
In this dual developing economy, there are two regions : rural and urban. For a 
given level of capital K and labor L, the rural region produces agricultural good Y and the 
urban region produces manufacturing good X. Basically, the only modification in this 
chapter is the institution of urban unemployment and thus the production cost in the 
urban sector becomes higher due to minimum wage. Other information such as the 
production functions and the properties of X , Y , A, and Z and the utility function and 
expenditure function will remain unchanged. Details are given by equations (3)-(6) and 
(13) in the previous chapter respectively. 
In the factor markets, capital K and labor L are perfectly mobile between sectors and 
regions. The full employment condition of capital K is given by equation (1). Following 
Harris and Todaro (1970)，urban wage is set by a minimum wage, w , which is higher 
than the rural wage, w . Since the urban wage is above the market-clearing wage, 
unemployment L^ is thus resulted in the urban region. The urban unemployment level 
could be further intensified when rural workers migrate to the urban region in search for 
high paying jobs. The migration process continues until the expected urban wage equals 
the rural wage : 
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w = i (29) 
1 + y" 
where u = ———> 0 is the urban unemployment ratio and expresses as the 
probability of finding a job in the urban region. By using the definition of / i , we can 
write the labor constraint as 
L = L y + i \ + M){L^+L,) (30) 
where L is the labor endowment in the economy. 
Now, let's consider the equilibrium condition in the factor markets. By Shepard's 
lemma, the first partial derivative of the unit cost function yields unit factor demand. 
According to equations (1) and (30)，factor markets clear when the total demand for 
factors equals to its total supply : 
c: (w, r)r+(l + iu)[cl (W, r)X + c^ (w, r)A\ = L (31) 
c；(w,c；'(w,r)Y + cf. (vv,r)A = K (32) 
where K is the endowment of capital in the economy. 
In the final goods market, the effective prices of goods X and Y are reduced to 
p - tX^ and 1 - rXy after adding the emissions tax burdens. With the introduction of 
minimum wage in the urban sector, producers in the manufacturing sector are now facing 
to a higher production cost per unit : c^{w,r). Under perfect competition, the final 




If the abatement sector is located in the urban region, the production cost of producing 
one unit of abatement activity is thus c/ (w, r). The zero-profit condition requires : 
p,=c\w,r) (35) 
where p^ equals r in equilibrium. 
Given the distortion in the labor market, we reconstruct the revenue function as 
follows : 
R{p -TX^,1 - T X y K ) = 
Up-TXx )X{L^ ,尺，）+ 0 - r^ V (丄 r，欠 )+ 1 (36) 
+ ")(丄,+L 力= L,Kx+Ky+K 尸 K 
Suppose the dual developing economy imposes specific tariff t to protect its 
manufacturing sector X. Any revenues collected are assumed to be returned to the 
general public in a lump-sum fashion. In equilibrium, the economy's budget constraint 
is represented by equations (13)—(15) and (36). 
Equations (10)，(14) - (15)，（29) and (31) - (35) provide complete description of the 
dual economy, which consists of nine unknowns : T,W,r,JU,X,Y,A,M and wplus one 
policy instrument t. The system is block recursive: equations (33)-(35) determine the 
price variables of T,W and r whereas equations (10)，(29), (31)-(32) determine the urban 
unemployment ratio // and the output variables of X, YandA . Last, we can use the price 
and output information to solve for welfare u from equations (14) and (15). 
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4,2 Resource Allocation - The effects of import tariffs 
In this section, we examine how import tariff affects prices, unemployment and 
output in the dual economy. Total differentiate equations (33)-(35)，we can find the 
changes on the factor returns in response to import tariff. Based on the small country 
assumption, import tariff raises the effective price on manufacturing goods. This leads to 
an expansion in the manufacturing sector, causing higher demand in capital. According 
to equation (33), the return to capital in the manufacturing sector will be increased, given 
the wage rate is fixed in the urban sector. 
色 = ? 广 0 (37) 
dt Cr + 义;^ c. 
On the contrary, the increased cost on capital and pollution tax burden have altogether 
raised the unit cost of producing good Y. Since the price of good Y remains unchanged, 
the higher production cost leads to a reduction in the rural wage rate by equation (34): 
^ = (38) 
dt 
The fall in the rural wage rate causes workers to migrate from rural to urban region in 
search for high-paying jobs. In other words, import tariff exacerbates rural-urban 
migration and hence the urban unemployment problem. The urban unemployment ratio 
therefore rises. Total differentiate equation (29), we can see : 
办二-(1 + //) (39) 
dt w dt 
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According to equation (37)，the import tariff has raised the effective price of good X 
following by an increase in capital return. From equation (35)，the higher capital cost 
brings up p ^ , given fixed urban wage rate. Since producers are indifferent to pollute or 
to abate, p^ equals r in equilibrium and hence : 
— = X A >Q (40) 
That is, an increase in import tariff will push up the emissions taxes. 
After incorporating the urban unemployment in our model framework, the results 
derived from equations (37)，(38) and (40) show that factor intensity seems to have no 
influence over factor returns. Whether or not the manufacturing sector is a capital-
intensive industry, import tariff deteriorates urban unemployment via the increase of 
capital returns. 
As for the environmental impact with regards to import tariff, recap equation (19): 
dZ dX . ciY dA 
—A V H Av 7" 
dt X dt dt dt 
The changes on the net emissions are determined by the composition changes in the 
output market. In the presence of urban unemployment, import tariff raises the emissions 
tax through the expansion in the manufacturing sector. As pollution becomes more 
expensive, the demand for abatement activity will increase. By the result from equation 
(40), we have : 
m o (41) 
dt dP^ dt 
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dJl 
where > 0 (See Appendix I). From equations (31)-(32) and (41), we can solve for 
dPA 
the output effects in response to an increase in import tariff as below: 
f = i ; � f " + " - � < f f H . � （42) 
f = 7 ^ f * “ ( l + + . + # 4 ) f ) ] < � （43) 
y V^w C�v J “I J ) 
C义 C^  
where B' > 0 and D' >0. As shown in Appendix II，A3 = (1 + / / ) 今 > 0 by the 
stability condition. That means, the manufacturing sector is required to be more capital-
intensive relative to the agricultural sector. In line with our assumptions, the abatement 
sector is more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector as it locates in the urban 
r^ 
region, i.e. > (1 + / / ) 今 . I f the elasticity of emissions tax to import t a r i f f , � , ， i s 
c c w w 
less than 1�，then the output effect of manufacturing good Z is - — > 0 (See equation 42). 
CtL 
Also, note that if the urban unemployment ratio (/ / ) increases, it will dampen the output 
effect in the abatement sector. Therefore, we also obtain — > 0 according to equation 
dt 
(42). From the results shown above, import tariff will induce production in the urban 
region given the manufacturing goods and the abatement goods are relatively more 
3 Refer discussion on the elasticity of emissions tax to import tariff, S:“ in Chapter 3. 
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capital-intensive to the agricultural goods. These conditions ensure producers in the 
urban region to earn sufficiently large capital return so as to offset the wage loss created 
by minimum wage. For the output effect of agricultural goods Y, production will be 
reduced as more workers migrate to the urban region, ^ < 0 . However, to satisfy this 
at 
result, it requires manufacturing good ^ to be more capital-intensive than abatement good 
A in addition to the stability conditions, see equation (43). Hence, import tariff will hurt 
dz 
environment if manufacturing production dominates, —— > 0. 
at 
In short, import tariff worsens the environmental quality. An increase in import tariff 
raises the effective price of manufacturing good which in turn leads to an expansion in 
the industry. Comparatively, since agricultural producers pay flexible wage, the higher 
capital cost can be adjusted through lowering labor cost. The lower rural wage 
encourages rural-urban migration which further aggravates the urban unemployment 
problem. Hence, the agricultural sector contracts. Although producers in the abatement 
sector face to a higher capital cost, the increased manufacturing production raises 
emissions which, in turn, expand the abatement sector. Eventually, p rises as less capital 
is available for the production in the final goods market. In addition, an increase in the 
unemployment ratio forces government to raise the tariff rate. These altogether causes 
4 For — < 0 ’ it r e q u i r e s � ， > 1 causing the manufacturing production to rise proportionally less than the 
abatement activity. 
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4,3 National Welfare 
In a small open economy under tariff regime, the welfare effect can be obtained by 
totally differentiating equations (14)-(15): 
�Eu-tEyt-t�Epp-R"�令 Eyj^ (44) 
+ 〜 “ 义 , + 义 广 1 ) 苦 苦 
where — is uncertain , — > 0 and — > 0 . The first three terms are same as the 
dt dt dt 
results derived in Chapter 3，the analyses are summarized in the following paragraphs in 
the context of urban unemployment. 
Recap the first term on the right-hand side is trade distortion,《五卯 一 尸.尸）< 0， 
which is welfare reducing. The pollution distortion is denoted in the second term whose 
sign is indeterminate, depending on the value of r , f , , , factor intensity of the industry. 
Suppose the manufacturing sector is relatively more capital-intensive than the abatement 
sector. Import tariff could possibly harm environment if the elasticity of emissions tax to 
import tariff, , , is less than 1 and the unemployment ratio is high. We can see that as 
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long as the tariff-induced emissions are large enough to outweigh the output effect in the 
abatement sector and the agricultural sector. Then, we have : 
dZ , dX , dY dA ^ 
——=A.——+ Xy >0 
dt X dt y dt dt 
(+) (-) (+) 
If the emissions taxes are initially too low, T the emissions cannot be fully 
internalized and thus import tariff reduces social welfare. 
Next, we turn to the third term on the right-hand side of equation (44) i.e. the 
(IT 
spillover effect on trade distortion, tR.,.(A. + Aj, -1)——.From equation (40),——>0. 
‘ dt dt 
As discussed in Chapter 3，an increase in the emissions taxes will contract the tariff-
induced manufacturing production, = — < 0. Further by equation (44), it shows 
dr 
that the spillover effect depends on the marginal net emissions,义;^ + 义^  — 1，in the 
economy. When the marginal pollution supply is larger than the marginal abatement 
demand, + Xy - \> 0, the environmental reform creates a negative spillover effect on 
(IT 
trade distortion, tR ,AXy +/lv -1)——< 0. Asa result, social welfare deteriorates. 
‘ p r \ J / ' dt 
The last term is the wage distortion, -w(丄;^  + L �年 ’ where the impact of import 
dt 
tariff to unemployment ratio is posi t ive,年 >0 . Import tariff albeit leads to an 
dt 
expansion in both the manufacturing sector and the abatement sector, it virtually makes 
the rural-urban migration problem even worse. As explained before, import tariff brings 
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down the rural wage rate causing labor to migrate to the urban region. However, with the 
institution of minimum wage, producers in the urban region operate at a lower output 
level that requires less labor. In consequence, there is an oversupply of workers in the 
urban region and thus the unemployment ratio soars. Furthermore, from equation (44), 
we can see that the more the workers hired in the urban region {L^ + 丄义)，the larger the 
wage distortion. This is because urban workers receive minimum wage at the expense of 
those unemployed. Since labors are inefficiently allocated to the urban region resulting in 
an efficiency loss，the wage distortion is therefore welfare reducing, -w{Lx . 
According to our results, import tariff pushes up emissions taxes and thus worsens the 
environmental quality if s^ , is less than 1. In other words, import tariff does not help 
alleviate either the urban unemployment problem or the environmental damage. Hence, 
we do not see the "double dividend" result as in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996) and 
Schneider (1997). In fact, import tariff worsens environmental quality and urban 
unemployment. 
To summarize the above analyses, we can conclude the following consequences for 
LDCs. The trade policy used as an import substitution measure creates triple negative 
effects in the economy. Firstly, it creates trade distortion in the economy. The 
imposition of import tariff has encouraged LDCs to expand the industry that it does not 
have any comparative advantages at all. At the same time, consumers are forced to 
purchase more expensive domestic goods. Thus, import tariff creates a dead weight loss 
to the economy. Secondly, a lax environmental policy could damage environment if the 
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tariff-induced pollution is too large to be offset by the output effects in the agricultural 
and the abatement sectors. Thirdly, import tariff exacerbates rural-urban migration and 
thus worsens the urban unemployment problem. In sum, import tariff deteriorates social 
welfare. 
4,4 Trade Liberalization 
Now, we consider the impact on environment and social welfare when trade is 
liberalized for LDCs. From equations (40), (19) and (44): 
dr c: ^ 
— ~ 7 > 0 
dt c^ 
〜 义 〜 [ 〜 
dt X dt ^ dt dt 
( I , � ) 含 = “ 〜 厂 〜 + <。 
When government lowers tariff, emissions tax rate and the net emissions level will 
decrease, but the welfare effect will increase. Thus, Pollution Haven Hypothesis is not 
sustained in our model. 
Proposition 2 : Assuming T < E? , A reduction in tariff will increase welfare but reduce 
environmental damage for a small open economy with unemployment, when the 
manufacturing production dominates. 
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Since the manufacturing sector is protected by import tariff, its production shrinks if 
tariff is lowered. As more imports are now available, trade distortion dampens. As a 
result, the tariff-induced unemployment problem will be alleviated. Thus, the wage 
distortion is corrected through trade liberalization. Since the manufacturing sector is 
pollution-intensive, the contraction in the manufacturing sector improves environmental 
quality. In other words, trade liberalization will have a positive spillover effect on 
pollution. Consequently, the emissions taxes are lowered in response to a lower 
abatement demand. Hence, trade liberalization will improve welfare. 
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Chapter 5 Tariffs，Labor Unions and the Environment 
Distortion in wage structure could sometimes come in the form of collective 
bargaining power, namely, the formation of labor union. The purpose of forming labor 
unions is often to raise workers' welfare, particularly, for the wage increment and job 
security. Economists generally regard this kind of rent maximizing ability as monopoly 
power. According to Pancavel (1996), labor unions in developing countries are usually 
concentrated in the capital-intensive industry e.g. petroleum and transportation, which are 
owned by the state government or entrepreneurs. He describes these union workers are 
"among the elite of the economically active population" in the country no matter 
financially or politically. 
There is no doubt about the political power of labor unions in LDCs. For example, in 
Argentina and Venezuela, labor unions remain the most powerful pressure group to 
influence public policies, e.g. private ownership scheme, industrial regulations and 
international trade etc. Given its political roots, economic policies in these unionized 
economies are, sometimes, not designed for the best interests of the majority. In fact, 
labor unions are widely known as the pioneering opponents to free trade. The motivation 
of advocating trade restrictions is obvious. Under protection policy, employers of the 
unionized firms are protected from foreign competition while at the same time, union 
workers enjoy high union wage without loosing their jobs. Yet, this imposes a serious 
resource allocation problem to the economy, which greatly impairs economic growth. 
Empirical study conducted by Hirsh and Link (1984) shows that productivity growth is 
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slower when the industries are highly unionized and are with faster union growth rate. 
Similarly, in Addison and Hirsch (1991) study, they find that unionized firms experience 
a slow productivity growth than non-unionized firms owing to less investment 
contributed to research and development projects. 
It has been of researchers' interests to examine the welfare implications on labor 
unions and trade policies. Brander and Spencer (1988) and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 
(1991) use international oligopoly frameworks to study how strategic trade policies affect 
union wage and domestic welfare. With a similar framework, Zhao (1995) focuses on the 
issue of foreign direct investment in the unionized economy. Later, Naylor (1998) 
investigates the relations between economic integration and union wage. 
In spite of these significant studies, the linkage between environment and labor 
unions; however, has rarely been discussed in the literature. Chao and Yu (2003b) argue, 
in the closed economy, the bargaining power of domestic union creates a negative impact 
on the environmental quality through lowering capital return. However, there are no 
discussions on trade policies and labor unions in the context of environmental quality. In 
this chapter, we are planning to complement the literature in this area. To simplify the 
model, we adopt a perfect competitive framework to study the impact of trade policy to 
environment under such distortion in the labor market. 
5,1 The model 
To better understand the environmental impact of import tariff in the presence of 
labor unions, we again apply Chua's (2003) framework to capture this feature. 
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According to Pancavel (1996), the costs of organized labor activities in the rural area is 
so high that labor unions in developing countries are commonly found in the urban region 
only. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that, for a given level of capital K and labor L, 
manufacturing good X is produced in the unionized sector whereas agricultural good Y is 
produced in the non-unionized sector. Since there are no fundamental changes on the 
production side of the model, equations (3) — (6) and (13) give details on the production 
functions and properties of X�Y, A and Z. 
In the factors markets, capital K and labor L are perfectly mobile between sectors. 
The full employment condition of capital K is given by equation (1). In the labor market, 
the union wage is determined through a Nash bargaining process (Nash 1950) between 
representative capitalist and representative union in the manufacturing sector. First, 
government imposes a specific tariff, t. Then, labor union will bargain with producers in 
the manufacturing sector over the wage rate. Once the union wage, w, is determined, the 
capitalist will hire labors based on the factor demand. The residual workers are thus left 
to the non-unionized sector receiving competitive wage, w„，which is determined by the 
market. Each firm in the unionized sectors has a separate labor union. We also assume 
that the union has a rent-maximization utility function : ^ 
U = {w-w,)L, (46) 
where w — > 0 is the wage differential between the unionized and the non-unionized 
sectors, and L^ is the labor employed in the manufacturing sector. Per equation (46), we 
have assumed labor union is risk-neutral over the preference of wage and employment 
5 See Oswald (1985), Pencavel (1994) and Lingens (2003) for comprehensive discussions. 
44 
level. It shows the higher the wage differential and the number of workers being 
employed in the manufacturing sector, the higher the utility level achieved by the labor 
union. The wage bargaining solution is to maximize the following Nash product: 
max Q. = (U-UY{r-r) (47) 
where p represents the relative bargaining power of the union, and U and F denote the 
disagreement points of the union and the capitalist respectively. When the wage 
negotiation breaks down, union members go on strike and as a result, output in the 
unionized sector is suspended. Thus, the payoffs at the disagreement points are zero to 
both parties i.e. U = r = 0 (Binmore et. al 1986; 1989, Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 1991， 
Zhao 2001，Lingens 2003). 
To obtain the optimal bargained wage, we maximize the Nash product given by 
equation (47) with respect to union wage, w (Appendix III): 
w 二 ^ r (48) 
1 w dr w dLy 
+ L � Pr dw L^ dw ^ 
QcX 
By Shephard's lemma, L^ = c^ {w, r)X where c^ (w, r) = is the unit labor 
dw 
requirement for producing one unit of good X. Define G^ = - — — which is the 
‘ r dw 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in producing good X, and 
sX = - " ^ "丄，is the wage elasticity of labor demand in manufacturing sector X. g^ 
Lx dw 
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reveals a contrary relation between w and r. That is, when union wage increases, the 
capital return decreases. Likewise, for s ^ , an increase in union wage will result in lower 
labor demand in the manufacturing sector. As shown in equation (48)，the union wage is 
above the competitive wage by a wage mark-up, which depends on the relative union 
power, P , the elasticity of labor demand in the manufacturing sector, s^ and the 
elasticity of substitution of capital and labor, . Rewrite equation (48)，we have : 
w = (49) 
where is the mark-up of competitive wage w,, . Note that 
(J)(^ P)=——-p ^ > 1 to assure w > and ^'(y^) > • (See Appendix III). From 
— < 7 y + 
equation (49)，the higher level of competitive wage or the union bargaining power will 
dw , 
drive up the union wage i.e. = > 1 and ——=(j> > 0. 
op 
Consider the equilibrium condition in the factor markets. By Shephard's lemma, the 
first partial derivative of the unit cost function yields unit factor demand. By equations (1) 
and (2), factor markets clear when the total factor demand offsets by its total supply : 
c： (w, r)JC+c: (w„ , r ) 7 + c：；, (w, r)A=L (50) 
= K (51) 
where K and L are the endowments of capital and labor in the economy. 
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Next, we consider the market clearing conditions in the final goods market. After 
taking the effect of emissions tax, the effective prices of goods X and Y are p - zX^ and 
X-rXy. Following the union wage agreement, producers in the manufacturing sector are 
required to pay a mark-up on the competitive wage according to equation (49). In 
contrast, producers in the agricultural sector pay the competitive wage, , which is 
lower than w. The unit cost functions for both producers are thus represented as : 
c^(w,r ) and respectively. Perfect competition ensures that unit price equals 
unit cost: 
p - T A , ^ = c \ w , r ) (52) 
l-rA), =c) ,K，r) (53) 
Assuming that the abatement sector locates in the unionized sector and pays union wage, 
w. Let c^ {w, r) be the unit cost function for producing one unit of abatement good, A. 
The zero profit condition requires : 
(54) 
where p為 equals r in equilibrium. 
Finally, the expenditure function that represents the demand side of the economy is 
given by equation (13)，whereas equation (6) describes the supply side of the economy. 
Assuming that tax and tariff revenues are returned to the public in a lump-sum fashion, 
equations (14) - (15) depict the economy with balanced budget. 
6 Refer to Chapter 3 for the equations and properties of cosumer's utility function, expenditure function 
and revenue function. 
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The partially unionized economy is modeled by equations (10)，(14)-(15) and (49)-
(54). There are nine unknowns : r , , r , w,X, Y, A, Mand u plus one policy variable t 
and an exogenous variable, fS. The system is block recursive : equations (49)，(52) - (54) 
determine the impact of import tariff on price variables r , r, w, while equations 
(10)，(50) -(51) solve the optimal value for output variables X’ Y and A. By using the 
prices and outputs information, we can obtain the impact on welfare u from equations (14) 
- (15) . 
5.2 Resource Allocation 一 The effects of import tariffs 
Next, we explore the impact of import tariff to environment for a partially unionized 
economy. Totally differentiating equations (52) - (54)，we can solve the changes on 
factor returns given the changes of import tariff. By equation (52), an increase in import 
tariff raises the effective price of good X. This leads to an expansion in the 
manufacturing sector resulting in higher demand for capital. Under perfect competition, 
the return to capital must increase, as the union wage cannot be readily adjusted.^ 
字 = 力 < + V ： ； 芒 ) > 0 (55) 
dt A4 dw^ 
7 Equation (57) shows that when T increases as t increases, the abatement production will rise causing the 
manufacturing production to contract. By stability condition in Appendix III, the abatement industry is 
more capital-intensive than the agricultural industry. According Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, the capital 
return will increase, 
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where 
A . ^ . y f ^ ^ . / C,^  Cf d w ^ , y ( Cr C^ 
� � ‘ + V 入 ‘ - W w ‘ < 0 
V^vv C�v J ^w ^^n J V W ^w ^^n J 
/ V y ^ \ / A V \ / J y ^ \ 
. , . , c , c^ dw „ c,. c, dw . , C^ dw „ , ^ , 
in which - V F — — > 0 , ——<Oand ~ > 0 by stability r c dw c c dw c c dw 
condition (See Appendix III). 
In addition to pollution tax burden, an increase in capital cost pushes up the 
production cost in the non-unionized sector. Since the effective price of good Y remains 
unchanged, the competitive wage rate must decline according to equation (53): 
^ = (56) 
dt A4 
As mentioned above, the import tariff has driven up the effective price of good X and 
thus the capital cost. Equation (54) shows that this results in an increase in p^ . In 
equilibrium, p片 equals r because producers are indifferent to pollute or to abate. Hence, 
we must have : 
• = 乌 >0 (57) 
dt A,"、：戟） 
To examine the impact of import tariff on union wage, we need to totally differentiate 
equation (49): 
〜 〔 奶 ( 5 8 ) 
dt dt 
where > 1. According to stability condition, the manufacturing sector is relatively 
more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector. Due to an increase in import tariff, the 
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manufacturing sector expands whereas the agricultural sector contracts. Since good X is 
more capital-intensive, it demands more capital than labor, which thereby lowers the 
union wage.^ In short, protection policy reduces the wage rate in both the unionized and 
non-unionized sectors.^ 
We now turn to the environmental impact in response to import tariff when the 
economy is partially unionized. Recall equation (9): 
dZ dX dY dA 
=AY H /IY 
dt X dt y dt dt 
which is composed of the output changes in the manufacturing sector X, the agricultural 
sector Fand the pollution abated, A. As discussed previously, import tariff raises the cost 
of capital. From equation (57), p^ has to increase. Hence, the abatement output should 
increase (See Appendix I ) : 
包 >0 (59) 
dt dP^ dt 
The output effects in the manufacturing sector and the agricultural sector can be 
obtained by equations (50) - (51) and (59). 
孕 = 去 � 4 + D" + c^^ f 马 - 4 ] 字 ] • � (60) 
dt 、\<； c f j dt\ 
f = 去 转 宇 ] < 0 (61) 
dt clA, Lc；；^ l^c；；^  ct)dt_ 
8 We should note that w is still above w„ ； otherwise, there is no incentive to form labor union. 
9 The standard results from literatures predict protection policy enables union to raise wage. While these 
often are 1 x 1 model with only one factor input i.e. labor, and thus it has no specification on factor 
intensity of the sector. (Brander and Spencer 1988，Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 1991，Naylor 1998). Our 
result is more consistent with Zhao (2001)，who demonstrates that union wage will decline in response to 
import quota by using a specific factor model. 
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X Y Q Q 
where A 5 =今-今 >0 by stability condition, and B" < 0 , D" < 0 . Stability also 
, c^ cj - 1 • 1 . 1- cf - , dw , • 
shows - T kr > 0 which implies because > 1 (See Appendix 
ct c： dw„ ct c： dw„ 
III). 
The overall impact of import tariff to the manufacturing production is ambiguous. In 
particular, import tariff raises the return to capital via the downward adjustment of union 
wage. As a result, the unionized sectors expand. Nonetheless, this expansion depends on 
how the resources allocate between the manufacturing sector and the abatement sector. 
Apparently, by equation (60), an expansion in the manufacturing sector generates higher 
level of pollution which raises the abatement demand. In the meantime, the production of 
abatement goods will pull out resources from the manufacturing sector, which in turn 
causes the manufacturing production to shrink. Thus, the output effect of good X is 
uncertain. Following our analysis in the previous chapters, if the elasticity of emissions 
tax to import tariff, is less than one, the tariff-induced production of X should rise 
proportionally more than that of good A. In other words, import tariff will induce 
manufacturing production, > 0 . 
Besides, import tariff reduces agricultural production — < 0 through two 
dt 
channels. First, import tariff pushes up the capital cost yielding higher unit cost of 
producing agricultural goods. At the same time, the expansion in the unionized sectors 
requires more factors of input. Given that union wage is higher than the competitive 
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wage, labors will prefer to work in the unionized sectors. As a result, labor migration 
further contracts the agricultural production, see equation (61). In sum, import tariff 
could harm environment if the tariff-induced manufacturing production dominates, 
dZ n ——>0. 
dt 
5,3 National Welfare 
For a partially unionized economy, the impact of import tariff to social welfare is 
analyzed by totally differentiating equations (14)- (15) as below : 
似 似 (62) 
where — > 0 but the signs of — and ^ ^ are ambiguous. Note that ^ ^ represents 
dt dt dt dt 
the sectoral reallocation effect in the labor market after the imposition of import tariff. 
By equation (62), domestic welfare is composed of four distortions in the economy. The 
first three distortions on the right-hand side of equation (62) have been discussed 
extensively. Here, we will briefly recap the main idea of those distortions. The first term 
on the right-hand side of the equation is trade distortion, ti^E^ - Rp,^)，which is welfare 
reducing. Next is the pollution distortion, whose impact on environment indeed is 
determined by the composition effect in the output market. When s � , < 1 and the tariff-
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induced manufacturing production dominates, then the environmental quality ——> 0. 
dt 
Hence, import tariff hurts welfare in LDCs where government adopts less stringent 
environmental policy, (r - E^)——< 0 . The third term is the spillover effect on trade 
dt 
distortion, which depends on the marginal net emissions, X^ + Xy . As seen, 
emissions taxes cannot help correct trade distortion when the marginal pollution supply is 
larger than the marginal abatement demand, i.e. + Xy - . That means import 
tariff is welfare reducing, tR^.^ {X^ +Xy - \ ) < 0 . The last term, — (w — w j ^ ^ ， i s the 
labor reallocation effect caused by import tariff. The sign of is ambiguous. By full 
dt 
employment condition given in equation (2)，we have the following : 
〜 二 - 阵 + & ) 》 0 (63) 
dt y dt dt ) 
where the sign of ^ ^ is uncertain and ^ ^ > 0 (See Appendix III). As shown in 
dt dt 
Appendix III, the effect of is determined by the output effect in the manufacturing 
dt 
sector. When s^., < 1, the manufacturing production will rise proportionally more than 
the abatement production, i.e. > 0 . In this case, we obtain ^ ^ > 0 and hence 
dt dt 
^ ^ < 0 . As discussed earlier, import tariff stimulates manufacturing production. The 
dt 
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higher capital return and the lower union wage altogether drive up the labor demand in 
the manufacturing sector. At the same time, the agricultural sector contracts as capital 
becomes more expensive. Thus, the labor demand in the agricultural sector decreases. 
Under trade protection, producers are able to sell at higher price, which in turn 
compensates for the expensive labor cost in the unionized sectors, i.e. the union wage. In 
other words, import tariff could be used to correct the wage distortion in a unionized 
economy, and thus it is welfare improving, - (w - > 0 . 
dt 
To sum up, the welfare effect is ambiguous for a partially unionized economy. In 
particular, there is a trade-off between the environmental quality and jobs. On one hand, 
the condition for achieving clean environment requires the tariff-induced manufacturing 
production not to dominate. On the other hand, import tariff stimulates manufacturing 
production that helps create employment opportunities in the labor market. But this 
follows by an elevated level of emissions. Therefore, import tariff itself is hard to achieve 
two objectives at the same time. This result implies that protection policy benefits the 
union members in LDCs but at the expense of the environmental quality. 
5,4 Trade Liberalization 
Now, we consider the impact on environment and social welfare when trade is 
liberalized for LDCs. From equations (57)，(19) and (62): 
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dt A4 < aw,丨 
dZ , dX , dY dA ^ 
——二 A；^^  h Ay > U 
dt dt dt dt 
+ 〜 “ 义 … y 一 1) J - ( w - m O 令 
If government adopts free trade policy by lowering tariff, the emissions taxes will 
decrease whereas the environmental quality will improve. However, the welfare effect 
remains ambiguous. 
Proposition 3 : Assuming T < E^ , A reduction in tariff will reduce environmental 
damage for a partially unionized economy. But it may hurt social welfare as the wage 
distortion will increase when the manufacturing production dominates. 
As shown above, free trade policy will help improve environmental quality as the tariff-
induced emissions decline. As a result, the emissions taxes will decrease. But free trade 
policy might worsen the reallocation effect in the non-unionized sector because the 
released union workers are not efficiently allocated. When the manufacturing sector is no 
longer protected by import tariff, manufacturing production will contract and thus the 
abatement production. Since union wage is higher, it makes the released union workers 
difficult to leave the unionized sector for a low paying job. Hence, we see that the larger 
the wage differential, the larger the reallocation effect. In short, the welfare effect in 
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response to trade liberalization is ambiguous depending on the magnitude of the wage 
differential. 
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Chapter 6 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, we have analyzed the environmental impact and the welfare 
implications of adopting import tariff for a small open economy. We also incorporate the 
real world settings, i.e. urban unemployment and labor unions, into our general 
equilibrium model. Based on our results, the impact of protection policy is potentially 
harmful to developing countries. Owing to the lax environmental standards, 
environmental quality worsens in all three cases : full employment, urban unemployment 
and labor unions, when the capital-intensive industry is under protection. For example in 
the case of urban unemployment, protection policy tends to reinforce the unemployment 
problem. According to our earlier comparative static results, the higher unemployment 
rate will dampen the abatement output response and thus raises the output in the 
manufacturing sector. If this tariff-induced output effect dominates, emissions will rise. 
In LDCs, governments often adopt protection policy in the manufacturing sector to solve 
the unemployment problem. Since the capital-intensive industry is also pollution-
intensive, protection policy will induce excessive emissions. Hence, trade liberalization 
could help LDCs achieve better environmental quality because the manufacturing sector 
will contract in the presence of international competition. In short, there seems to have 
little evidence to support the Pollution Haven Hypothesis per our model. 
Nonetheless, the welfare effect in response to free trade is ambiguous. In our 
analyses, trade liberalization will improve welfare in the full employment and the urban 
unemployment cases. But when the economy is partially unionized, trade liberalization 
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creates a resource reallocation problem. If the labor reallocation effect dominates, free 
trade may hurt welfare. Although there are wage distortions in both the urban 
unemployment and the labor union cases, the impact of import tariffs on social welfare is 
conflicting. The main reason contributes to this contradiction is the difference in the 
wage structure. For the urban unemployment case, the urban wage rate is fixed at a 
minimum level. Producers in the urban region thus incur higher labor cost which is not 
adjustable when import tariff is imposed in the capital-intensive sector. On the contrary, 
in the case of labor unions, the union wage is not fixed. Recall that labor unions have 
risk-neutral preferences, they are indifferent to the wage rate or the employment 
opportunity. This wage structure allows union wage to be adjusted downwards. Hence, 
producers in the unionized sector bear lower labor cost than that when minimum wage 
exists. In short, producers are able to increase production closer to the efficient level and 
thus welfare is enhanced. 
Our studies have presented the impact of trade liberalization in a small open 
economy where only one import sector is modeled. In fact, there exist more than one 
sectors subject to import tariffs in the developing countries. According to the studies on 
piecemeal trade reform (Falvey 1988，Anderson and Neary 1992), a reduction of import 
tariff will improve welfare if all importable goods are complements. However, if all 
importable goods are substitutes, the sufficient condition to enhance welfare is to reduce 
the highest tariff. Yet, if we take environmental concern into account, these results might 
be different. Consider the case when importable goods are substitutes and the one with 
the highest tariff is less pollution-intensive than others. Then, lowering the highest tariff 
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will increase its import demand but will decrease the import demand on others. This 
stimulates domestic production in the pollution-intensive sector. So trade liberalization is 
likely to deteriorate environmental quality and welfare. Future research on such issues 
would provide insight on free trade policy for LDCs. 
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Appendix III 
1. The supply curve of abatement good, ， i s derived according to the 
dA 
calculations from Chua (2003),——>0 if a>y. That is, it requires 
dr 
agricultural sector, Y to be relatively more labor-intensive than manufacturing 
sector, X. (Note that T = p^ in equilibrium.) 
- r a-ly _ 
a I z l ] I ^ ^ k I 丄 ) “ 1 I >0 , 
dr \ y J [l-rAyJ dt \a-r)\\-TXy) y{\-TXyf) ’ 
1 
where A 二 ^ ^ ^ > 0 
k ( l - a ) 丨 - « J 
2. Letting p be the Langrange multiplier, the first-order conditions for expenditure 
minimization are : p = 1 and v\Cx) = p, giving that C^ is a function of p 
alone. In addition, because p is equal to 1, we have = 1 by the envelope 
property. 
3. Differentiate equations (7) 一 (9) to obtain the impact of import tariff to factor 
prices : 
卜 - c- xAfdw^ f l ) 
C： C； Ay dr = 0 (dt) 
� c = c，-lJUrJ [ o j 
hence, — = — ( - c j - cf ； ) < 0 
dt A, 
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今 = 〜 又 … : ) > 0 
at A , 
dt a / 人 L 〜 力 d 
where A. = f 4 " 4 V " 4 V f 4 " > « 
�C\v ^w J V^W ^w J V^w ^w y 
4. Since 心 < 0，cl^  <Oand 心 > 0，we therefore have : 
B = {xct + r心 + < )尝 + fe. + YcH + Aci > 0 and 
D == - f e + rc： + Aci}f - (Xc^. + Yc: + Acf^.) J > 0 
5. Stability Condition : 
Equations (7) - (12) represent the dynamic adjustments of the economy : 
X = a\p-TXx r)} 
w = {cf^ (w, r)X + cl {w, r)Y + c^ {w,r)A-L} 
,二[cf (w, r)X + cl {w, r)Y + cf iw,r)A-K} 
i 二 乂 ( P J } 
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where dot variable denotes the time derivative and a, is the positive speed of 
adjustments. Linearize the above equations around the equilibrium values and 
denotes the variables with ‘‘〜，，• 
xl r 0 0 -c^ -cf ojx-x 
Y 0 0 -cl -cl 0 Y-Y 
f = 0 0 1 -ct -c^ 0 T-T 
w = c；^  c： 0 G H ct w-w 
r c; cl 0 R S c^ r-r 
_ a \ [ 0 0 0 0 1 
where G = [Xcl + Fc：, +Acl)<0,H = {Xci + Ycl +Aci)>0, 
R = fe + + Aci) >OmdS = {Xcf, + Ycl, + 私 - ) < • 
The D-stability for all speeds adjustments of the original nonlinear system 
requires that every principle minors of odd order is nonpositive and every 
principle minors of even order is nonnegative (Quirk and Saposnik, 1968). 
Denoting the principle minor by J,, (i = 1 to 6), 
X Y Y \ f / J Y \ f X A \ f X Y \\ 
J - h e V ^ - ^ + ; i + 
J fi 一 X Y "^X^w^w A Y ^^Y^w^w X A ^^w^w Y y 
�e�v w^ J \ V^W w^ y V W W^ / V W w^ J^ 
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f x ^Y \ f ^X ^A \ 
c c c c 
Stability requires > 0 , and hence y > 0 , j > 0 and 
V v^v ^w y VC�v ^w 
(A Y\ 
Q Q 
- J 一 Y > 0 are needed. That is, the manufacturing sector is more capital-




1. Totally differentiate equations (33) - (35) to solve the changes of factor returns 
for a corresponding change in import tariff: 
' 0 cf z A f d w ^ � 1 ) 
C,^ c； Ay dr = 0 (dt) 
�0 c- -\)[dT) toj 
^ dr 1 _ 
hence — = —r 7> 0 
dt 
dt 
包 = c ， >0 
dt cf 
2. In urban region, minimum wage is higher than the equilibrium wage resulting in 
unemployment L". Let ju be the urban unemployment ratio, 
Lx^LA 
Thus, it gives equation (29): 
� L y + L. ) w 
w=w = 
{L^+L,+LJ \ + ju 
Totally differentiate equation (29), we have : 
dju ^-{\ + /u)dw ^^ 
dt w dt 
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3. Since < 0 ， < Oand > 0, we therefore have : 
万’二心々 + (〜〜⑷ 〜 二 確 >0 
七時+ c 减 >0 
at at 
4. Stability Condition : 
Equations (10)，(31)-(35) represent the dynamic adjustments of the economy. 
X = {w, r) 
Y = a^{l-TXY-c\w,r)} 
w = a,{cl (w, r ) r + (1 + M)[ct (环’ r)X + cf, (w, r)A\-L} 
,={c^ (W, r)X + cl (w, r)Y+c^ {w,r)A-K] 
A = a,{A-A{P,)} 
where dot variable denotes the time derivative and a, is the positive speed of 
adjustments. Linearize the above equations around the equilibrium values and 
denotes the variables with 
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r 0 0 -A；, 0 -cf 0 Tx-z" 
f 0 0 -Ay -c : -c； Oy r - r 
T _ 0 0 1 0 -c^ 0 T-r 
w 一 cl 0 G H + w-w 
r c; cl 0 Ycl S c^ r-r 
_ A \ [ 0 0 0 0 1 I A - A _ 
where G = r 心 + (w, r)X + c^ (w, r)A)^ < 0, 
dw 
The D-stability for all speeds adjustments of the original nonlinear system 
requires that every principle minors of odd order is nonpositive and every 
principle minors of even order is nonnegative (Quirk and Saposnik, 1968). 
Denoting the principle minor by •/, (/ = 1 to 6), 
/ X Y \ 
V � ^w y 
[V cM 
Stability requires Jg > 0 , and hence the condition of - (1 + > 0 is r r 
V w i � v y 




1. To find the relation between competitive wage and union wage, we maximize the 
Nash product given by equation (47): 
max Q = ((w - Y r 
Using w as the choose variable, the first order condition yields : 
W = ^ 
w dr w dLy + L 
� j3r dw L^ dw ^ 
2. To show (/>\/3)，we take total differentiation of (f>{j3) with respect to p : 
/ \2 
’ 一 ^ 1 f ^ Y - — ' 
伞、�化一( V \wdr ^ w dL, 
1 yp r dw L^ dw ^ 
1 w dr w dLx 
1 � P r dw L^ dw ^ 
Thus, ( l ) \P)>0 i f - — < 0 . Bychainrule, - ^ = ^ — < 0 
^/w dw dt dw 
3. Totally differentiate equations (52) - (54), we obtain the impact of factor returns 
for a corresponding change in import tariff: 
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Cr C 入X f -C^ —— 
加” \ \ dp 
cl cl Ay — , = 0 ⑷ + 0 � d p � 
r^ r ^ ^ _1 [ d r J i o ) — 
I J I 叩 ) 
, dr - i f Y 0 ^ ^w ^ ^ 
hence — = — > 0 
dt A^ dw,^) 
令•〜)<0 
/ 1 Y \ 
dr - 1 Y A c^ c,. dw A 
dt A, [c^^ cl dw„ J 
where 
A 4 - C � 人 X y ^  〜〜—， � V w J y <0 
4. Since 心 < 0，c'^ <0and 心 > 0, we therefore have : 
at dt at 
心今 + + c:A)苦 + (c;，+ c:.Y + cU)^ < 0 
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5. Stability Condition : 
Equations (10), (50)-(54) represent the dynamic adjustments of the economy. 
X = a\p-rXx -c^iw,r)} 
= a , {c；^ (w, r)X + c： , r ) r + c；； (w，r)A-L] 
r = a,{ cf (w, r)X + c； (w„ , r ) 7 + c；" (w,r)A-K} 
A = a,{A-A(P,)} 
where dot variable denotes the time derivative and a,- is the positive speed of 
adjustments. Linearize the above equations around the equilibrium values and 
denotes the variables with ‘‘〜，’• 
r - n � 0 0 - c ^ — - c X 0 1 � � 1 ^ ^ z义 c�v 己 冰 " c 丨 . u 
y 0 0 -Ay -cl " -C； 0 r - r 
L o o 1 - c ： ! ^ - C - 0 H � 
^ C： c： 0 G H ct 卜下 
A ' ' ‘ ^ ‘ ‘‘ A-A 
[ 0 0 0 0 1 J 
where G = [xc^ + A c ^ ) ^ + Ycl<0,H = Xci + f c： + Act > 0 
R = fe + A c i + rc：, > 0 and = X c : + Fc： + Act < 0 • 
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The D-stability for all speeds adjustments of the original nonlinear system 
requires that every principle minors of odd order is nonpositive and every 
principle minors of even order is nonnegative (Quirk and Saposnik, 1968). 
Denoting the principle minor by j. {i = 1 to 6), 
“ X Y / X Y - \ 
V^W � Y A- Y _ C,. dw 
( V c M 
Stability requires J ^ > 0 , and hence the condition of ^ > 0 , 
fc；^) ^ (cf cj. aw) ^ (cf cl aw^ ^ 
- V T > 0 ， ^ r F " ： ^ > 0 ， - T — ~T 了 > 0 are needed. That is, the 
U； O Cw 加 J {< <^ �v 加 J 
manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive than both the agricultural sector 
and the abatement sector. Furthermore, it requires the abatement sector to be 
more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector. 
6. Totally differentiate equation (2) 
dLy _ (dLx dL^� 
dt \ dt dt , 
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Since the first partial derivative of unit cost functions gives the unit factor demand, 
we have: 
Hence, 
dLy ，，X dw 、，X dr X, \dX “ . 
t 紀 紀 广 加 ) I > 0 仏 , < 1 
dL. ^ . dw . A dr . dA . 
_ d - = Aci^ ——+ A c t — + c 二（w，r)——>0 
f , wvv 7 . 7 . V ' / » . dt dt dt dt 
dLy (dLy -
i- = — + ~ - < 0 
dt \ dt dt ) 
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